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I. INTRODUCTION  
Tuberculosis or TB (short for tubercle bacillus) is an infectious chronic disease caused by 
various strains of mycobacteria that attack the lungs and possibly other body parts. Dr. Robert 
Koch announced his discovery of TB on March 24
th
 1882.  During this period, TB killed one out 
of every seven people living in the United States and Europe. It was the main cause of death 
worldwide in the nineteenth century and modern TB cost between US$1.4 and US$2.8 billion in 
gross domestic product annually worldwide (Grimard and Harling, 2010).  The World Health 
Organization lists TB as second only to HIV/AIDS as the most deadly disease due to a single 
infectious agent. TB’s intriguing profile has led public health sectors to strive to provide quality 
and affordable care to patients. Growing populations and increasingly tight government budgets 
are driving many countries to search for ways to finance their health services. One dominant 
solution is to institute user fees (Alleyne, 2010). I define user fees for TB as the reported amount 
patients pay for treatment at medical facilities.  
The World Bank’s (1987) agenda for health financing reform asserts that the 
implementation of user fees will improve equity by generating more revenue to expand cost 
effective basic health care services. Since then, user fees have come to play a significant role in 
the financing and delivery of public health care services in many countries. After the World 
Bank published studies to support the implementation of user fees in 1987, 90% of the 47 Sub-
Saharan African countries put in place some form of user fee (Gordon-Strachan et al. 2010). As 
of 2010, Witter (2012) lists six countries without any form of user fee: Angola, Timor-Leste, 
Liberia, South Sudan, Malawi, and Uganda while the others have some form of user fee system 
inplace. Interestingly, these countries are not linked by income as they range from wealthy 
countries to below average based on the purchasing power parity terms. Since 1987, health care 
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user fees have been scrutinized. The main arguments for and against the use of user fees in the 
literature can be grouped under the welfare enhancing effect of equity, efficiency, and revenue 
generation (Alleyne, 2010).  
Some studies support the equity enhancing potential of user fees. These studies support 
that user fees provide non-discriminatory access. In examining the case in Peninsular Malaysia, 
Heller (1982) argues that the implementation of user fees does not affect access to health care 
because the total medical demand is inelastic to cash price. Heller states that the demand for 
health services is primarily influenced by other factors such as the quality and proximity of 
health care services rather than cash prices, such that an increase in revenue increases access to 
quality care. Similarly, Audibert and Mathonnait (2000) found that utilization of health services 
increased following the introduction of user fees in Mauritania. The increase in utilization in 
Mauritania was due to an increase in the quality of healthcare. Their results suggest that users are 
willing to pay more when the quality of care increases. Soucat et al. (1997) found an increase in 
utilization of curative and antenatal care due to an increase in quality of services following the 
implementation of the Bamako Initiative (user fees were implemented) in Benin and Guinea. 
Studies in literature that supports user fees ability to achieve equity based on the reasoning that 
the retained fees are used to improve and expand the coverage and quality of health facilities. 
Also, some studies support the efficiency enhancing potential of user fees. These studies 
suggest that user fees rationalize the use of health services among users. Krutilová (2010) found 
that user fees help in efficient use of health care services from the significant decrease in 
frivolous use observed in Czech Republic after user fees were implemented. Also, Griffin (1988) 
stated that user charges are helpful in making health care more efficient and equitable by 
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rationing the use of health care services and teaching individuals how to prioritize their needs to 
unnecessary visits.  
Some studies question the equity and efficiency enhancing nature of user fees. Burnham 
et al. (2004) stated that Uganda abolished user fees in 2001 because they led to unnecessary 
suffering and death of citizens. Moreover, Nyonator and Kutzin (1999) found that official 
exemptions from user fees put in place for the poor were non-functional in the Volta region of 
Ghana. They conclude that these fees failed to protect access and income for poor members even 
though they contributed to the financial sustainability for the health facilities.  
Other studies in the literature support the revenue generating potential of user fees. After 
reviewing different works in the literature on user fees, James (2006), argues that the major role 
of user fees is revenue generation. He states that overall user fees are too small in absolute terms 
to finance all uncovered areas. Burnham et al. (2004) found that revenues from user fees were at 
least sufficient to improve drug supply. Gilson’s (1997) study showed that the national user fee 
systems have on average generated about 5% of total recurrent health system expenditure. Gilson 
also found that Ghana recovered 12% percent its total recurrent government expenditure from 
user fees in 1993. Hence, the amount of revenue generated by user fees varies in across counties 
and by year. 
Inefficiency in collecting revenues and inability to easily determine exemptions hinder 
the ability of user fees to serve as a means of generating revenue (Heller, 1993).In addition to the 
pressure to keep fees low, weak accounting and resource management practices undermine 
revenue generation levels of user fees. Heller concludes that if introduced alone, fees are unlikely 
to achieve equity, efficiency, and sustainability.  
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 Although some papers have analyzed the effect of user fees on regular patient visits, 
other studies have analyzed the impact of user fees on specific diseases. For example, Moses 
(1992) found that during the user fee period in Kenya at a referral center for sexually transmitted 
diseases, the mean attendance decreased in both sexes but male attendance decreased more than 
that of females. Alleyne (2010) found that user fees decreased access to diabetes and 
hypertension services in Jamaica. However, Wilkinson et al. (2001) found that when user fees 
were abolished in rural South Africa, preventative services for antenatal care and childhood 
immunization decreased.  His rationale is that the observed increased consultations for curative 
services caused clinic congestion that prevented visits for preventative care that were less urgent. 
The closest study to my work is Ansah (2009) because it analyses the effect of user fees 
on a health outcome (deaths from malaria and prevalence of malaria).  Ansah analyzed the effect 
of removing user fees for both health care utilization and health outcomes in Ghanaian children. 
This study on malaria randomized households into an intervention group in which the research 
provided free access to basic secondary care, and a control group in which the families paid for 
health care. The intervention arm attended formal health care facilities more and informal health 
care providers slightly less. The health outcomes in both groups were similar: 3% of the children 
in both groups had moderate anemia and the number of deaths were the same. They concluded 
that the change in cost revealed a change in health care seeking behavior but not necessarily a 
change in health outcome.   
The above literature review discusses the existing debate on the impact of user fees on 
equity and efficiency, and revenue for different health sectors (e.g. malaria). Ansah (2009) is the 
closest study to this research because it goes beyond the effect of user fees on equity, efficiency 
and revenue raising potential. My study follows the path of Ansah’s study to examine the long 
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run effect of how user fees affect the level of level of diseases. My paper adds to the literature by 
specifically investigating the effect of user fees on TB notifications—new cases of tuberculosis. 
Section II explains the economic theory used to address this question. Section III summarizes the 
data  used and section IV discusses my analysis and results. The paper ends with a conclusion 
(section V) that also contains the limitations of this work and proposals for future studies.  
II. THEORY  
The theory section explains the demand for TB services. It also explains the choices the 
government faces when implementing user fees. This section ends with an explanation of the 
market structure of TB services which is used to derive the guiding equation and hypothesis of 
my empirical analysis.  
The Consumer’s Choice: Demand for TB treatment services 
This paper builds on Heller’s (1982) theory that explains the factors that affect demand 
for health services in Malaysia. Heller’s is one of the first works in the literature that empirically 
analyzes the determinants of demand for medical services. Alleyne (2010) also uses Heller’s 
theory to investigate whether user fees reduce access to health care services without raising the 
quality of services. Alleyne finds that the type of disease determines the impact of user fees. This 
paper looks specifically at TB services rather than general health services. 
Heller’s theory assumes that an individual’s health status H is derived from the health 
production function: 
                                                     )                                                                      (1)                       
Where p is preventive services, e is the hygienic quality of the country, a is age, and x is other 
goods and services. My theory differs from Heller’s and Alleyne’s because I assume that if this 
function holds for an individual, it holds on an aggregate level for a country as well. Moreover, I 
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assume that the level of TB is a function of all the factors in equation (1) because the 
notifications of TB (my measure of TB infection in a country) are a subset of the health status of 
a country. I added curative services, c, to the function because TB is a contagious disease and 
user fees are usually implemented for TB treatment services. The more people that seek curative 
services, the less transmission of TB that will occur and fewer new cases will appear. I added a 
new variable t to incorporate the state of health services available in each country. A higher 
quality of health facilities and services will result in better health status of populations and thus a 
decrease in the level of TB. Lastly, because HIV and TB are co-epidemic, I introduced the 
variable v for HIV. Therefore, I assume that the health status of TB (measured by notifications of 
TB) is: 
                                                                                                                                   (2) 
I assume that an individual derives utility by consuming health services and other consumption 
goods. The consumer’s choice is represented by the indifference curve (IC) in Figure 1. Also, an 
individual’s choice is constrained by their income, represented as the budget line, BL. The 
optimum point of consumption is where the IC is tangent to the BL.  
I denote utility of the household U, health services H, and other goods, G. Hence, the 
utility function to be maximized is U(H, G). I also denote: household income, I, price of health 
services, P
h
, and price of other goods, P
g





.Using the Lagrangian multiplier, the consumer optimization problem (COP) 
becomes: 
                                                      –                                                              (3) 
The optimal level of consumption for health services which includes TB services is 
derived by solving the equations: 
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Solving these equations gives the factors that affect the demand for health services 
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The solution derives demand curve for TB services is shown in Figure 1. Hence, this model 
shows that TB services are normal goods. This assumption is similar to those of Alleyne (2010) 
and James (2006) when they examined the impact of user fees. 
The Government’s Choice: Supply 
This paper assumes that the market structure of TB services is a monopoly as shown in 
figure 2. The government, a benevolent social planner is the sole seller in the market because it 
owns all the public hospitals. It also has the power to decide what fees to charge for its services 
and faces the market demand derived in figure 1. The goal of the government is to maximize 
social welfare and it is constrained by its resources. TB reduction and provision of other public 
goods are subsets of social welfare that the government wants to maximize. 
As shown in figure 2, the government faces a tradeoff between using its available 
resources (revenue, technology and human capital) towards the reduction of TB or towards the 
provision of other public goods. The resources used are not perfectly mobile between the two 
sectors. Hence, the production curve is concave to the origin. The social welfare curve shows the 
combinations of TB reduction and other goods that the government will provide. Ideally, the 
government will pick the efficient point where its preference curve is tangent to the production 
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possibility frontier. At this point the government is maximizing all of its resources to produce the 
highest social welfare possible. In an extreme scenario, when the government institutes an 
unaffordable fee for TB treatment, no patient can afford the cost, and so TB will rise to its worst 
level. If the government decides to eliminate user fees, TB notifications will be at the lowest 
possible level. But, the government will have to give up the provision of other services in order 
to fund the free treatments. Therefore, the government faces a tradeoff between the level of user 
fees and the reduction in TB. 
The Market of TB Services 
My paper assumes that the market for TB services is a monopoly as shown in figure 3. 
Prior to the implementation of user fees for TB treatments, consumers face a cost of P0. Note 
that P0 is greater than zero because consumers incur other costs when seeking care. At this price, 
the government fund is used to cover the total cost of TB treatment which is equivalent to the 
difference between C3 and P0. The implementation of user fees implies an increase in the 
amount paid by consumers from P0 to P1. This rise in price results in a fall in the quantity 
demanded from Q2 to Q1 from the laws of demand and the assumption that TB services are a 
normal good. The magnitude of this fall depends on the elasticity of demand. The fall in the 
quantity of TB treatment services is a cost to society as indicated by a possible rise in TB levels. 
My paper investigates whether the fall in quantity of TB treatment services from Q2 to Q1 will 
cause a rise in the new cases of TB using panel data. 
The Hypotheses on the Effect of User Fees 
The null hypothesis from theory is that the implementation of user fees will cause a fall in 
the demand for TB treatment services, which will increase the notifications of TB. The increase 
in notifications arises because people stop getting treatments and spread the bacteria to healthy 
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individuals. The alternative hypothesis from theory is that the implementation of user fees does 
not worsen the level of TB. A reason for this may be that the demand for TB treatment services 
is price inelastic or that TB treatment services are not normal goods. It may also be that the 
revenue generated by user fees effectively improves the quality and quantity of treatment 
services.  
The Guiding Equation                                                                                                                      
 Based on figure 2, the elasticity and factors affecting the demand for health services 
(equation 7) determine the magnitude of the fall in quantity demanded. Therefore, the level of 
TB, measured as TB notification, is a function of the factors that affect the elasticity of demand 
and the other factors mentioned in equation (2). Mathematically, the guiding equation from the 
theory is: 
TB levelij= α + β1Userfeesij + β2factors affecting demand and elasticityij + β3age structureij + 
β4composite consumption of other goods consumedij + β5hygienic quality of the 
environmentij + β6quality of the health care system ij + β7HIV + εij                             (8)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The factors affecting demand and its elasticity are: price of TB service (user fees), the price of 
substitutes, income, preferences and population.  
III. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The WHO Global Task Force on TB Impact Measurement lists incidence (estimated 
number of newly arising cases), prevalence (estimated number of TB at a given time) and 
mortality (number of deaths due to TB) as the major indicators that measure the epidemiological 
burden of TB and its trends. I utilized notifications of TB over the three impact indicators 
because it gives the actual number of new cases detected by the internationally recommended TB 
control strategy, Directly Observed Treatment Short-course (DOTS) program. It is calculated 
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from the multiplication of TB incidence per 100,000 people and TB case detection rate. Here, TB 
case detection rate is the percentage of newly notified tuberculosis cases to the estimated incident 
cases. Some studies in literature, including Ansah (2009), use the number of new cases of 
diseases when measuring the impact of user fees. 
 Usually, studies in the literature go directly to clinics within a given geographic location 
to determine the exact user fee charged. Instead, this paper uses out-of-pocket expenditures per 
capita as a proxy for TB’s user fees Out-of-pocket expenditures are direct payments made by 
households to health care practitioners for any good or service provided with the intent of 
restoring the health status of an individual for any health condition. My method is advantageous 
because it provides the opportunity to examine over 200 countries at once and determine the 
most likely impact of implementing user fees. The variable, out-of-pocket expenditures per 
capital, is calculated from the product of out-of-pocket health expenditure (expressed as a 
percentage of total expenditure on health), the total health expenditure (expressed as percentage 
of Gross Domestic Product) and GDP per capita. Out-of-pocket payment is expected to contain 
user fees specific to TB and if TB’s user fees rise, we expect out-of-pocket payments to rise.  
 From the guiding equation, income, taste and preferences are controlled using Gross 
Domestic Product per capita. It is defined as the gross value added by resident producers divided 
by the mid-year population. Moreover, GDP per capita is a measure of an individual’s income 
and is used to control for the composite consumption of other goods and services. I expect a 
negative sign on GDP per capita because a larger income means individuals can pay the 
necessary medical fees which will decrease the level of TB. But, because GDP is used to control 
for a lot of factors, it’s sign could differ from my predictions. The size and age structure of 
countries are controlled using the percentage of working population (ages 15 to 64 years).  From 
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the theory, I expect a positive sign on this variable because with a larger population there is 
greater probability of having more TB cases. Studies have shown that TB is dominant among the 
working population. Moreover, the level of HIV was controlled using the HIV prevalence of the 
working population. It is calculated from the product of HIV prevalence (percentage of working 
population) and the working population. The theory predicts a positive coefficient on this 
variable because persons with a positive HIV status are 21- 34 times more likely to develop TB 
disease (WHO Fact Sheet, 2012) 
The hygienic quality of the environment is controlled for by using the sum of carbon 
dioxide emissions from solid (coal), liquid (petroleum-derived fuels) and gas (natural-gas) fuel 
consumption. This variable is used because carbon dioxide is the main atmospheric component 
that can activate inactive TB (Chauhan, 1991). Theory predicts a positive sign on Carbon dioxide 
because an increase in its amount means that more people will have active TB.  Life expectancy 
at birth is used to capture other classifications of the quality of the environment including that of 
the health care systems. Theory predicts a negative sign on life expectancy because a better 
quality of health services should cause a reduction in the level of TB. 
All the data used to estimate the variables in the final guiding equation are from the 
World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance Databases. Table 2 gives 
detailed information on the primary source of each variable. I used annual data from 1960 to 
2012. The table 2 shows the summary of all the final variables. Data were collected from 142 
countries. They were collected over a 52 year period. The entire panel data set is unbalanced but 
contains a balanced subset of 1909 observations, which could result in selection bias. On 
average, the TB notifications per year are approximately 74 per 100,000 people with a largest 
observation of 855 in Swaziland in the year 2009. South Africa follows closely with 728 cases 
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per 100,000 people. This is expected because both are among the 22 high burden countries as 
classified by the World Bank. Grenada, the Cayman Islands and Bermuda are among the few 
countries with no new TB cases in certain years. HIV prevalence was highest in South Africa 
with 1,582 cases per 100,000 people and lowest in Tunisia with 5 cases per 100,000 people. 
 Switzerland had the highest out-of-pocket expenditure per capita of 13,397.20 (thousand 
USD) in 2010. On average, out-of-pocket expenditure is 1,008.939 thousand USD. The average 
GDP per capita is 6,466.19 (constant 2000 USD) and is within one standard deviation of BBC’s 
reported income per person
1
 in 2012. The largest GDP per capita 108,111 USD was observed in 
Monaco in 2008. On average, in any given country, the working population makes up 
approximately 58% of the entire population. Countries that lie significantly above this mean will 
have greater likelihood of having higher burden of TB. Moreover, in any given year, the average 
carbon dioxide emission per country is 92mt. The average life expectancy is 62.5 years. Most 
countries have a life expectancy that is below that in the United States (75yrs).  
IV. ANALYSIS 
Estimation Issues 
I took the natural log of all variables except for working population (already a 
percentage), to interpret results as percentages and to normalize the skewed distribution of each 
variable. The final estimation equation is:  
LnTBnotificationsij = αij + β1LnOut-of-pocket paymentij + β2Working populationij + 
β3LnLife expectancyij + β4LnCO2 emissionsij + β5LnGDP per capitaij + 
β6LnHIVprevalenceij + eij                                                                                                                                             (4) 
                                                          
1
 $10,000. 
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Here, “i” and “j” represent country and year respectively. Hence, available data points were 
collected for each variable for 142 different countries from the year 1960 to 2012. The residuals 
of the modified guiding equation were tested for serial correlation using the Wooldridge test. The 
results
2
 provide evidence that there is first order autocorrelation. Hence, I rejected the null 
hypothesis of no first order serial correlation. Serial correlation is corrected by using robust 
standard errors. Robust standard errors increase the standard errors to reduce the probability of 
making false conclusions. The corrected results diminish the likelihood of biased standard errors 
of our coefficients. The Fisher test is used to test for unit roots in all variables. The results
3
 show 
that all the variables are stationary. Hence, the null hypothesis of presence of unit roots is 
rejected. Therefore, the likelihood of spurious correlation that inflates R
2
 and t-scores is reduced.  
Figure 4 shows a plot of the residuals, which signals the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
The Breusch-Pagan / Cook –Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity confirms a non-constant 
variance
4
, which is addressed by using robust standard errors. Then, a pairwise correlation is 
used to estimate the presence of multicollinearity between the variables. The results show a 
statistically significant negative correlation between the natural log of TB notification cases 
(lnTBnotification) and all the explanatory variables. The correlation coefficients between LnOut-
of-pocket payment and the other explanatory variables are statistically significant and positive. 
The largest coefficient, 0.8 is between LnOut-of-pocket payment and LnGDP is expected 
because larger income countries will have larger out-of-pocket payments. The variance inflation 
factor test gives a mean VIF of 3.35. Therefore, I conclude that multicollinearity is not severe.                                                                                                                                                             
 I determined the best estimator first by using the Breusch-Pagan Langrange Multiplier 
                                                          
2
Probability > F statistics = 0.00. 
3
 Probability > Chi-square = 0.00 for all variables. 
4
 Probability > Chi-square= 0.00. 
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test. It is used to decide between OLS estimator (Pooled regression) and the Random effects 
regression. The results
5
 provide evidence to reject the null that the variance of the groups are 
zero (no panel effect) and that a random effects model is appropriate. Then, I conducted a 
Hausman test to choose between a fixed effects and a random effects model. The results
6
 provide 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of zero correlation between error terms and that the fixed 
effects regression is more appropriate.  A fixed effects regression controls for time invariant 
characteristics (constant cross-sectional variation) that differ between countries but are constant 
over time. The result is consistent with the theory, since I am interested in observing the effects 
of user fees over time while holding constant country specific traits. 
Main Results        
Table 3 shows the main regression (fixed-effects) results for this study. All of the 
variables have a statistically significant effect on user fees, measured as out-of-pocket payments, 
with the exception of the working population and life expectancy variables. The result has a 
negative coefficient for LnOut-pocket payment. This implies that when all individual country 
characteristics are held constant, a 1% increase in out-of-pocket payments decreases the 
notifications of TB by 0.14% over time. This result fails to support my theoretical prediction that 
an increase in user fees will result in an increase in the notifications of TB. The R-squared value 
for this regression model implies that the model is efficient in explaining 5.8% of the variation in 
TB notifications. 
A Granger causality test is conducted to identify the temporal order between out-of-
pocket payments and notifications of TB to address the causality problem between user fees and 
TB notifications. It is not necessarily a true causality but a close estimate in determining whether 
                                                          
5
 Probability > Chi-square = 0.00. 
6
 Probability > Chi-square = 0.00. 
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one variable is useful in forecasting another. The results in Table 4 show that out-of-pocket 
payment precedes the new cases of TB. Hence, it is not the decline in new cases of tuberculosis 
that drives the increases in user fees for TB treatment. Instead, the implementation of user fees or 
an increase in user fees “granger causes” the decrease in TB notifications. A possible reason for 
this relationship is that the revenue generated by user fees is effective in improving the quantity 
and quality of treatment services (Audibert and Mathonnait, 2000).  
Moreover from the main results, a 1% increase in the prevalence of HIV results in a 
0.16% increase in TB notifications. This result is in line with my theoretical prediction that a co-
epidemic disease like HIV will increase the notifications of TB. The carbon dioxide coefficient is 
also statistically significant and implies that an increase in the level of carbon dioxide activates 
dormant TB, and thus increases TB notifications. Although not statistically significant, the signs 
of the coefficients for life expectancy and GDP are the same as theoretical predictions. Both 
coefficients are negative and imply that an increase in either life expectancy, a measure of 
quality of health services, or an increase in GDP, a measure of income per person, will result in a 
decrease in TB notifications. Lastly, the sign of the coefficient on working population is negative 
and different from theoretical predictions. However, it is neither economically nor statistically 
significant. Overall, this model is significant in explaining a within country variation of 6%. 
Robustness tests 
This section tests the robustness of the main results above to changes in my assumptions. 
In each robustness test, when new variables are added, I address estimation issues and the proper 
estimator remains the fixed effects regression. 
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Trend of Tuberculosis 
 New cases of tuberculosis have been falling for several years. The 2012 Global Report 
for TB cites that the rate fell by 2.2% between 2010 and 2011 while mortality rate has decreased 
by 41% since 1990. The already decreasing trend in TB could be a reason why TB notifications 
are decreasing despite the increase in user fees as observed in the main regression results. In 
order to address this possibility, I controlled for the trend in TB by including the variable year in 
my regression. The results shown in Table 5 reinforce previous findings that out-of-payments 
decrease TB notifications even after the decreasing trend of TB is eliminated. The magnitude of 
the impact of user fees on TB notifications decreases by 0.004% after controlling for the trend in 
TB notifications. Here, the model explains 6.8% variation in TB notifications which is one 
percentage point higher than that explained in the main regression results. 
Lagged effect of out-of-pocket payment 
A current increase in user fees can have a delayed effect on the notifications of TB. This 
occurs because TB can remain dormant in the human body for years before it is activated to 
produce an obvious illness that compels people to get tested and before it can spread to others. 
Hence, it is necessary to investigate the lagged effect of payments on the notifications of TB. The 
regression results in Table 6 show a 6 year lag effect of fees. All the lagged coefficients for 
LnOut-of-pocket payment are statistically and economically significant. They are all negative 
coefficients and imply that there is a lagged effect of the increase in out-of-pocket payments on 
the notification of TB. The magnitude of the coefficient for out-of-pocket payments increased as 
the lagged year increased up until the fifth year lag after which it began to decline. The results 
suggest that an increase in out-of-pocket payments five years ago has the largest impact on the 
current notifications of TB.  The Table 7 shows the lagged effect of user fees after the trend in 
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TB notifications is eliminated. The results are similar with those without TB trend eliminated 
(Table 6). Hence, there combined lagged effect suggests that an increase in user fees has a 
negative lagged effect on the level of TB. The amount of variation in TB notifications explained 
by the lagged effect model varied by each time lag but averaged out to be 5.3%. 
 Regressions by regions 
Geographically, the TB burden is highest in Asia and Africa. The 2012 Global Report 
states that about 60% of TB cases are in South-East Asia and Western Pacific regions. The 
African region has 24% of the world’s cases. Hence, user fees might have a different impact on 
TB notifications for certain regions of the world. Scholars in my literature review focus on 
specific hospitals in different countries. And so, examining all countries together could mask the 
difference in the effect of increasing user fees. Table 8 shows the regression results for six WHO 
regions. The coefficients for out-of-pocket payment are negative in all regions. Only the region 
of the Americas has a statistically significant coefficient for out-of-pocket payments. It is also 
the region with the largest impact, where a 1% increase in out-of-pocket payment causes a 
0.187% decrease in TB notifications. A possible explanation for this is that out-of-pocket 
payments are used more effectively and efficiently in this region relative to the others. 
 The Table 9 shows the regression results after the TB trend is eliminated. Here, the 
coefficient for out-of-pocket payments in the Americas region is still negative and statistically 
significant but the coefficient in South East Asia is positive and statistically significant. It 
implies that when out-of-pocket payments increase in South East Asia, the notifications of TB 
also increase. A possible explanation for this result is that the revenue generated from user fees 
in South East Asia are not used to improve the quality of treatment services. The R-squared 
values increased in magnitude in comparison to the R-squared value for my main regression 
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results. In South East Asia, when the trend in TB is eliminated, the regression model is efficient 
in explaining 82% of the variation in TB notifications. On average the model explains 33% of 
the variation in TB notifications within each region in comparison to the 5% variation in TB 
notifications explained when all regions are combined (Table 1). 
Regression High Burden Countries                                                                                                             
 The WHO classifies 22 countries as high burden TB countries (HBC), most of which are 
in Africa and South-East Asia. These countries account for approximately 80% of new TB cases 
each year. According to the 2012 Global TB report, India and China account for about 40% of 
the world’s TB cases. Therefore, it is important to discover if the regression results for HBCs 
differ from those when all countries are combined. In Table 10, regression (i) shows the 
regression results for HBCs using fixed effects. The coefficient for out-of-pocket payment is not 
statistically significant but its magnitude is greater than that in the main regression by 0.1%. This 
result suggests that an increase in out-of-pocket payment has a greater impact in reducing in the 
notifications of TB in high burdened TB countries. HIV prevalence is the only statistically 
significant coefficient. Just like the theory predicts, a 1% increase in HIV prevalence will 
increase the notifications of TB by 0.3%. The magnitude of the coefficient on HIV prevalence is 
also higher than that of the main regression by 0.2%. Regression (ii) eliminates TB trend and its 
coefficient of out-of-pocket payments is still negative but not statistically significant. In both 
regressions, the results suggest that relative to other countries, when HBC countries are 
examined separately, the impact of HIV prevalence on the notifications of TB is greater than in 
other countries on average. On average, both models are significant in explaining 46.8% of 
variation in the notifications of TB based on their R-squared value. 
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Other measures of TB’s Burden 
My regression results so far propose that an increase in out-of-pocket payment results in a 
decrease in the level of TB, measured as notifications of TB. The notifications of tuberculosis are 
a good proxy for the level of TB in a country. They are, however, inefficient in clearly 
differentiating the cause of the decline in TB notifications. It is unclear whether the decrease in 
the number of TB notifications is due to a decrease in TB infections or a decrease in the number 
of people getting tested. Therefore, I also use TB mortality rate as a measure of the level of TB 
because it is independent of whether or not people choose to get tested. In Table 10, regressions 
(i) shows that the coefficient for out-of-pocket payment is positive but neither statistically nor 
economically significant. Regression (ii) shows the regression result when the trend in TB is 
eliminated. The results are still positive but not statistically significant. Hence, no conclusions 
can be drawn from these regressions. 
 Another measure of the epidemiological burden of TB is its incidence, that is, the 
estimated number of new cases of TB. It is the same as TB notifications but different because it 
is an estimated value. In Table 7, regression (i) gives a negative but not statistically significant 
coefficient for out-of-pocket payments. Regression (ii) shows the results when the trend in TB is 
eliminated. Although out-of-pocket payment is negative, no concrete conclusion can be drawn 
because it is not statistically significant. 
Income inequality 
Tuberculosis is dominant among the poorer populations. Suk’s (2009) study on European 
Union member provides evidence of a negative correlation between public wealth index and TB 
prevalence rates. Hence, this section controls for inequality in the distribution of income using 
the Gini coefficient. The results in table 13, regression (i) show a negative and statistically 
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significant coefficient on out-of-pocket-payment. Also, the regression (ii) gives a negative 
coefficient that is statistically significant on out-of-pocket payments when controlling for TB 
trend. Both results provide evidence that an increase in user fees decreases the notifications of 
tuberculosis. This model explains 15% of the variation in TB notifications. The R-squared value 
for these regressions is ten percentage points greater than that in the main regression result.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this paper is to test the hypothesis that user fees increase the notifications of 
TB. The guiding equation for my analysis is derived from the demand and supply framework that 
is based on the utility maximization problem of the consumers and the government. The main 
regression used is the fixed-effects model in which HIV prevalence, working population, life 
expectancy, carbon dioxide emissions and income are controlled to observe the effect of out-of-
pocket payment on the notifications of TB. My main regression shows that an increase in out-of-
pocket payment reduces the notifications of TB. This result implies that user fees are effective in 
rationing the demand for TB services and improving the health status of populations. The 
Granger causality test provides evidence that the increase in user fees precedes the decrease in 
the level of TB. Therefore, user fees “granger-cause” the reduction in the burden of TB. 
 The robustness section evaluates the findings of my main regression result using five 
approaches. I examine the lagged effect of payments on the notifications of tuberculosis. The 
combined lag effect is negative and statistically significant. The result provides evidence that an 
increase in out-of-pocket payment today will decrease future notifications of TB. Also, I 
examined whether the effect differs with regards to region. All the statistically significant 
coefficients are negative for user fees and concur with the predictions from theory. Moreover, I 
substitute TB death rate and incidence rate for notifications of TB. These substitutions are to 
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determine the cause of the decrease in notification rates observed in the main results. None of the 
coefficients for out-of-pocket payment are statistically significant. As a result I do not arrive at 
any concrete conclusion. Furthermore, I analyze the effect of user fees on the notifications of TB 
by reducing the sample size to only high burden TB countries. Although the main regression 
result is not statistically significant, it still has a negative coefficient on user fees. In my last 
robustness test, I controlled for inequality in the distribution of income and the results supported 
the findings in the main regression result. 
As a part of my robustness test, I control for the trend in TB reduction over time in the 
main regression result and in all the robustness tests. The regression results without the 
elimination of TB trend are very similar to those in which TB trend is eliminated. Overall, the 
robustness tests suggest that user fees do in fact reduce the notifications of tuberculosis over 
time.  Based on these analyses, I find no evidence that suggests user fees increase TB 
notifications. In contrast, I find strong and robust evidence suggesting user fees are associated 
with fewer new cases of tuberculosis. 
Limitations and Future Studies 
As a limitation, my theory assumes that the government is a monopoly, because it 
chooses the price of user fees paid. Realistically, it is a monopolistic competitive market. 
Although the theory was simplified to a monopoly, the data obtained on user fees is not specific 
to the public institutions. Hence, it reflects the monopolistic nature of the market.  Furthermore, I 
utilized a weak measure for user fees—out-of-pocket payments that is not specific to TB services 
because of the lack of more specific data. Thus, this weak proxy may diminish the accuracy of 
my results. Another limitation of the study is the assumption that TB treatment services are 
normal goods with a downward sloping demand curve. While this can be true, it is also true that 
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people are very insensitive to treatment prices. Individuals will go the extra mile to sell off assets 
and belongings in order to afford the treatments, so demand is very inelastic.  
If given further opportunity for more research, I will use variables like population density 
to control for the overall quality of the environment since TB is an air-born disease.  Moreover, 
future studies can create models specific to each of the WHO world regions that will effectively 
capture the results of implementing user fees. Such studies can also incorporate in their theory 
the strategy used by government in that region to select amount of user fee. These elaborations 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1: Deriving the Demand Curve for TB services 
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Variables Units Source Primary Source 
TB case detection 
rate 
% of incident 
cases 
World Data Bank-WDI & 
GDF 
World Health Organization, Global 
Tuberculosis Control Report 
Out of Pocket 
Health 
Expenditure 
% of total 
health 
expenditure 
World Data Bank-WDI & 
GDF 
World Health Organization National 
Health Account database 
HIV Prevalence 
% of working 
population 
World Data Bank- Health 
Nutrition and Population 
Statistics 
UNAIDS and the WHO’s Report on the 




% of GDP 
World Data Bank-WDI & 
GDF 
World Health Organization National 
Health Account database 
GDP per capita 
(constant 2000) 
USD 
World Data Bank-WDI & 
GDF 
World Bank National Accounts data, 





World Data Bank-WDI & 
GDF 
1) United Nations Population Division. 
World Population Prospects, (2) United 
Nations Statistical Division. Population 
and Vital Statistics Reprot (various 
years), (3) Census reports and other 
statistical publications from national 
statistical offices, (4) Eurostat: 
Demographic Statistics, (5) Secretariat 
of the Pacific Community: Statistics 
and Demography Programme, and (6) 
U.S. Census Bureau: International 
Database 
CO2 Emissions kt 
World Data Bank-WDI & 
GDF 
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis 
Center, Environmental Sciences 
Division, Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, Tennessee, United States 
TB incidence per 100, 000 
World Data Bank-WDI & 
GDF 
World Health Organization, Global 
Tuberculosis Control Report. 
TB deathrate per 100, 000 
World Data Bank-WDI & 
GDF 
World Health Organization, Global 
Tuberculosis Control Report. 























Table 2: Summary Statistics                                 
 Variable Observation Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
TB Notifications (per 100,000 people) 1909 74.24 102.53 0.00 854.76 
Out-of-pocket payments per capita (1000) 1909 1005.82 1584.08 0.09 13397.20 
HIV prevalence 1909 101.04 456.49 4.96 1582.04 
GDP per capital (constant 2000) 1909 6406.43 10569.91 54.51 108111.00 
Working population (%) 1909 58.38 6.69 44.79 85.52 
Carbon Dioxide emission (mt) 1909 95.52 434.05 0.00 634.99 
Life expectancy at birth (years) 1909 62.54 11.54 26.81 83.16 
Country 142 - - - - 

























Table 3: Main Regression Results for New Cases of TB 
 
Regression Result 
Independent Variable (i) 
Ln Out-of-pocket-payment -0.139* 
 
(0.0730) 
Ln HIV prevalence 0.163** 
 
(0.0812) 
Working population -0.00967 
 
(0.0158) 
Ln Life expectancy -0.927 
 
(0.859) 
Ln Carbon dioxide 0.145* 
 
(0.0759) 







Number of countries 142 
R-squared (within) 0.058 
Note: (i) main results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level,  *significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4: Results from Granger causality  
Test F-Statistics Probability 
Fees precede 4.13 0.04 
Enrollment precedes 1.34 0.2477 
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Table 5: Regression Results After Eliminating the Trend in TB 
 
                        Regression Results 
Independent Variable (i) (ii) 
Ln Out-of-pocket-payment -0.139* -0.135* 
 
(0.0730) -0.0723 
Ln HIV prevalence 0.163** 0.188** 
 
(0.0812) -0.082 
Working population -0.00967 -0.00144 
 
(0.0158) -0.0168 
Ln Life expectancy -0.927 -0.465 
 
(0.859) -0.949 
Ln Carbon dioxide 0.145* 0.155** 
 
(0.0759) -0.0768 
Ln GDP -0.00799 0.0787 
 
(0.166) -0.166 
year - -0.0127 
 
- -0.0086 
Constant 11.68*** 33.59** 
  (3.217) -14.63 
Observations 1,909 1,909 
Number of countries 142 142 
R-squared 0.058 0.068 
Notes: (i) Main results, (ii) main results without TB trend. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Regression Results for a Lagged Effect of User Fees 
 
                                                 Regression Results   
Independent Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment -0.139* - - - - - - 
 
(0.0730) - - - - - - 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment Lag 1 - -0.138* - - - - - 
 
- (0.0702) - - - - - 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment Lag 2 - - -0.156** - - - - 
 
- - (0.0644) - - - - 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment Lag 3 - - - -0.166** - - - 
 
- - - (0.0743) - - - 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment Lag 4 - - - - -0.180** - - 
 
- - - - (0.0820) - - 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment Lag 5 - - - - - -0.165** - 
 
- - - - - (0.0795) - 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment Lag 6 - - - - - - -0.136* 
 
- - - - - - (0.0706) 
Ln HIV prevalence 0.163** 0.142 0.111 0.0958 0.102 0.116 0.0925 
 
(0.0812) (0.0963) (0.0998) (0.0959) (0.103) (0.105) (0.0984) 
Working population -0.00967 -0.00774 -0.00893 -0.00695 -0.00301 -0.00382 5.85e-05 
 
(0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0160) 
Ln Life expectancy -0.927 -0.961 -0.980 -1.029 -0.897 -0.591 -0.572 
 
(0.859) (0.802) (0.833) (0.868) (0.913) (0.907) (0.870) 
Ln Carbon dioxide 0.145* 0.176** 0.181** 0.200*** 0.173** 0.184** 0.172** 
 
(0.0759) (0.0694) (0.0711) (0.0719) (0.0774) (0.0757) (0.0692) 
Ln GDP -0.00799 -0.0487 0.00221 0.00905 0.0194 -0.0108 -0.0362 
 
(0.166) (0.156) (0.155) (0.151) (0.140) (0.131) (0.121) 
Constant 11.68*** 11.92*** 12.15*** 12.28*** 11.77*** 10.32*** 10.17*** 
 
(3.217) (3.010) (3.100) (3.216) (3.287) (3.239) (3.128) 
Observations 1,909 1,771 1,634 1,498 1,359 1,223 1,090 
R-squared 0.058 0.052 0.046 0.045 0.043 0.044 0.036 
Number of countries 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Notes: (i) Current year (ii) lagged by 1 year (iii) Lagged by 2 years (iii) lagged by 3 years etcetera. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Table 7: Regression Results for a Lagged Effect of User Fees ( TB Trend Eliminated) 
 
Regression Results 
Independent Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment -0.139* - - - - - - 
 
(0.0730) - - - - - - 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment Lag 1 - -0.129* - - - - - 
 
- (0.0690) - - - - - 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment Lag 2 - - -0.143** - - - - 
 
- - (0.0626) - - - - 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment Lag 3 - - - -0.155* - - - 
 
- - - (0.0782) - - - 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment Lag 4 - - - - -0.130* - - 
 
- - - - (0.0759) - - 
Ln Out-of-pocket payment Lag 5 - - - - - -0.0938 - 
 
- - - - - (0.0675) - 
LnOut-of-pocket payment Lag 6 - - - - - - -0.0961* 
 
- - - - - - (0.0578) 
Ln HIV prevalence 0.163** 0.166* 0.137 0.128 0.144 0.125 0.0917 
 
(0.0812) (0.0970) (0.0996) (0.103) (0.106) (0.0997) (0.0837) 
Working population -0.00967 0.000776 0.000705 0.00666 0.00687 0.0114 0.0167 
 
(0.0158) (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0159) (0.0163) 
Ln Life expectancy -0.927 -0.390 -0.208 0.287 0.888 1.204 1.167 
 
(0.859) (0.941) (1.035) (1.241) (1.289) (1.244) (1.238) 
Ln Carbon dioxide 0.145* 0.184*** 0.190*** 0.191** 0.198*** 0.182*** 0.161** 
 
(0.0759) (0.0704) (0.0715) (0.0757) (0.0735) (0.0682) (0.0636) 
Ln GDP -0.00799 0.0361 0.0949 0.117 0.0967 0.0890 0.141 
 
(0.166) (0.155) (0.154) (0.142) (0.131) (0.118) (0.118) 
Year - -0.0135 -0.0158* -0.0190* -0.0221** -0.0253** -0.0270*** 
 
- (0.00876) (0.00900) (0.00985) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0103) 
Constant 11.68*** 34.91** 38.73** 42.74*** 46.00*** 50.73*** 54.31*** 
 
(3.217) (14.79) (14.98) (15.73) (16.23) (16.08) (16.46) 
Observations 1,909 1,771 1,634 1,359 1,223 1,090 957 
R-squared 0.058 0.063 0.060 0.059 0.063 0.060 0.057 
Number of countries 142 142 142 142 142 142 142 
Notes: (i) Current year (ii) lagged by 1 year (iii) Lagged by 2 years (iii) lagged by 3 years etcetera. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 






















Table 8: Regression Results by WHO Regions 
 
Regression Results 
Independent Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Ln Out-of-pocket-payment -0.00890 -0.187*** -0.139 -0.0172 -0.120 -0.0318 
 
(0.137) (0.0591) (0.185) (0.333) (0.345) (0.132) 
Ln HIV prevalence 0.294*** -0.0623 -0.0136 0.384*** 0.626 -0.0743 
 
(0.107) (0.118) (0.0631) (0.0498) (0.349) (0.0664) 
Working population 0.0179 -0.0286 0.132*** -0.0693 -0.0946** 0.0356 
 
(0.0347) (0.0325) (0.0316) (0.0455) (0.0345) (0.0356) 
Ln Life expectancy -0.419 -1.595 -8.287*** -5.238*** -15.82* 3.102 
 
(0.648) (3.529) (2.328) (1.333) (8.403) (2.016) 
Ln Carbon dioxide -0.122 0.217 0.108 0.547 1.133* 0.328 
 
(0.121) (0.170) (0.160) (0.290) (0.573) (0.193) 
Ln GDP 0.524 -0.270 -0.119 0.382 0.948 -0.668 
 
(0.312) (0.289) (0.252) (0.741) (0.878) (0.496) 
Constant 4.290 19.65 36.49*** 24.58*** 57.95* -3.895 
 
(2.694) (12.89) (9.005) (4.931) (25.65) (8.570) 
Observations 516 401 567 98 132 181 
R-squared (within) 0.186 0.219 0.272 0.705 0.377 0.252 
Number of countries 40 29 42 7 10 13 
Notes: (i) Africa, (ii) Americas, (iii) Europe (iv) South East Asia, (v) Eastern Mediterranean, (vi) West Pacific. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level. 
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Table 9: Regression Results by WHO Regions (TB Trend Eliminated) 
 
Regression Results 
Independent Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
Ln Out-of-pocket-payment 0.0182 -0.184*** -0.0992 0.371** -0.0703 9.16e-05 
 
(0.144) (0.0632) (0.170) (0.128) (0.250) (0.0880) 
Ln HIV prevalence 0.107 -0.0666 0.0541 0.257*** 0.617 -0.0111 
 
(0.108) (0.118) (0.0731) (0.0486) (0.340) (0.0424) 
Working population -0.0394 -0.0358 0.112*** -0.0178 -0.101* 0.0134 
 
(0.0405) (0.0352) (0.0355) (0.0403) (0.0489) (0.0210) 
Ln Life expectancy -1.317 -2.537 -2.286 -10.68*** -17.56 13.33*** 
 
(0.843) (4.475) (3.303) (1.386) (12.58) (3.037) 
Ln Carbon dioxide -0.169 0.213 0.0567 0.108 1.176* 0.345*** 
 
(0.122) (0.172) (0.164) (0.123) (0.566) (0.0906) 
Ln GDP 0.400 -0.314 0.126 -0.993 0.747 -0.362 
 
(0.259) (0.351) (0.287) (0.953) (1.335) (0.459) 
Year 0.0395*** 0.00725 -0.0399*** 0.114*** 0.0165 -0.0723*** 
 
(0.0130) (0.0207) (0.0147) (0.0284) (0.106) (0.0168) 
Constant -65.09*** 10.01 89.06*** -174.1** 33.05 95.11*** 
 
(22.91) (30.44) (21.26) (49.60) (166.2) (23.65) 
Observations 516 401 567 98 132 181 
R-squared (within) 0.249 0.221 0.321 0.820 0.378 0.559 
Number of countries 40 29 42 7 10 13 
Notes: (i) Africa, (ii) Americas, (iii) Europe (iv) South East Asia, (v) Eastern Mediterranean, (vi) West Pacific. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 10: Regression Results for High burden Countries  
 
Regression Results 
Independent Variable (i) (ii) 
Ln Out-of-pocket-payment -0.25 -0.193 
 
(0.232) (0.208) 
Ln HIV prevalence 0.301*** 0.241** 
 
(0.086) (0.0918) 
Working population 0.0397 0.0234 
 
(0.0412) (0.043) 
Ln Life expectancy -0.207 -0.314 
 
(2.04) (1.319) 
Ln Carbon dioxide 0.0811 0.0166 
 
(0.298) (0.313) 
Ln GDP 0.409 -0.512 
 
(0.532) (0.657) 
Year - 0.0547 
 
- (0.0315) 
Constant 3.505 -98.02 
 
(7.143) (61.07) 
Observations 216 216 
Number of countries 16 16 
R-squared (within) 0.442 0.495 
Notes: (i) results, (ii) results without TB trend. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 11: Regression Results Using Tuberculosis Death rate 
 
Regression Results 
Independent Variables (i) (ii) 
Ln Out-of-pocket-payment 0.019 0.0278 
 
(0.0499) (0.0485) 
Ln HIV prevalence -0.0616** -0.0303 
 
(0.0292) (0.0334) 
Working population -0.0125 -0.0016 
 
(0.011) (0.0104) 
Ln Life expectancy -2.431*** -1.822*** 
 
(0.594) (0.652) 
Ln Carbon dioxide 0.0632 0.0698 
 
(0.0704) (0.0676) 
Ln GDP -0.294** -0.197 
 
(0.145) (0.138) 
Year - -0.0160** 
 
- (0.0065) 
Constant 14.79*** 42.36*** 
  (2.096) (11.36) 
Observations 1955 1995 
R-squared 0.243 0.243 
Number of countries 142 142 
Note: (i) results (ii) results without TB trend. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 12: Regression Results Using Tuberculosis Incidence  
 
Regression Results 
Independent Variables (i) (ii) 
Ln Out-of-pocket-payment -0.0422 -0.0376 
 
(0.0484) (0.0479) 
Ln HIV prevalence 0.0246 0.0411 
 
(0.0257) (0.0277) 
Working population -0.00393 0.00178 
 
(0.0108) (0.0112) 
Ln Life expectancy -2.138*** -1.818*** 
 
(0.5730) (0.6670) 
Ln Carbon dioxide 0.0844 0.0879 
 
(0.0547) (0.0543) 
Ln GDP -0.118 -0.0668 
 
(0.1110) (0.1100) 
Year - -0.0084 
 
- (0.0062) 
Constant 13.79*** 28.27*** 
  (2.0660) (10.7200) 
Observations 1955 1995 
R-squared 0.154 0.154 
Number of countries 142 142 
Note: (i) results (ii) results without TB trend. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 13: Regression Results Controlling for Inequality 
 
                             Regression Results 
Independent Variable (i) (i) 
Ln Out-of-pocket-payment -0.165* -0.179* 
 
(0.0924) (0.0919) 
Ln HIV prevalence 0.234** 0.245** 
 
(0.0943) (0.0950) 
Gini coefficient -0.00734 -0.00595 
 
(0.00585) (0.00611) 
Working population -0.0197 -0.00195 
 
(0.0251) (0.0289) 
Ln Life expectancy -2.502* -1.852 
 
(1.339) (1.678) 
Ln Carbon dioxide 0.125 0.154 
 
(0.151) (0.151) 
Ln GDP 0.0776 0.162 
 
(0.214) (0.212) 
Year - -0.0152 
 
- (0.0126) 
Constant 18.61*** 44.24** 
 
(5.016) (20.73) 
Observations 515 515 
Number of countries 127 127 
R-squared (within) 0.157 0.157 
Note: (i) results, (ii) results without TB trend eliminated. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level,  *significant at 10% level. 
    
